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TYING CONTRACTS-MAGAZINE DISTRIBUTORS FORCING PUBLICATIONS
ON RETAILERS
Introduction
In 1956, a Joint Legislative Committee of the New York State Legis-
lature convened "to determine if the statutory law of New York was
adequate to deal with the sale of magazines containing suggestive material
which fall within the twilight zone between that which is pornographic
and that which is not."' The concern of the New York Legislature merely
echoes the concern expressed by parents, educators, and law enforcement
agencies as to what can be done to limit or extinguish the sale of obscene
literature to the youth of the country; literature which is now blatantly
displayed and disseminated through the public newsstands. One of the
major problems to be considered by the committee was the use of
"tying" contracts, or restrictions, 2 by the magazine distributors. Under
this type of contract, the retailer has no right to determine what magazines
he will buy, and is pressured into accepting the pulp issues ("tied"
product) in order to obtain the more desirable ("tying" product) publi-
cations.
The operation is successful because the distributor has a monopoly. Given
a choice I believe most retailers would reject questionable publications,
and this would substanially reduce the objectionable material now available.
It was to this end that I suggested the contract between the distributor and
the retailer should be examined in the light of our anti-trust statutes both
Federal and State.a
The presence of just such a problem was the moving force behind the
passage of a New Jersey law4 that subjects a magazine distributor to
criminal prosecution if he utilizes tying contracts to force a retailer to
accept obscene literature. Former Assemblywoman Emma Newton, who
introduced the bill in the legislature, reported that a common defense
offered by the retailers, accused of handling obscene literature, was that
they had neither ordered nor desired such publications, but rather had
been forced to accept and offer for sale various items" of the distributor's
choice in order to obtain for resale the desired items handled by the same
distributor.5
1 Letter from Henry P. DeVine, Assistant District Attorney, Nassau County,
New York, to the Notre Dame Lawyer, Nov. 28, 1956, on file in Notre Dame Law
Library.
2 These contracts are alternatively described as "tying" or "tie-in" contracts.
Also, depending on the individual preference of the court and the particular
factual situation, these contracts are additionally termed "restrictions", "sales", or
"agreements."
3 See note 1 supra.
4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:115-3.1 (1953).
5 Letter from William M. Lanning, Senior Assistant to Counsel, Law Revision
and Legislative Services, State of New Jersey, to the Notre Dame Lawy.er, Feb. 20,
1958, on file in Notre Lame Law Library.
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It should be noted that the spokesman for the New York Joint Com-
mittee6 talked of "twilight zone" pornography, apparently referring to
those publications which, though suggestive, probably could not be
confiscated nor the publisher or distributor prosecuted under the applic-
able federal or state obscenity statute.7 The skirmish line is drawn in
the area of obscenity legislation and perhaps someday a statute will
evolve whose standards will be so clear and easily ascertainable that all
"obscene" literature will be treated as obscene.8 But until this situation
truly exists, it is incumbent on the American people generally, and the
legal profession particularly, to militate against this seemingly endless
flow of smut into the channels of public consumption in any manner
legally available. This Note will consider one of the possible means to
such an end - the prohibition of tying restrictions between the magazine
distributor and his retail outlet. It is true that if tying restrictions can be
prohibited, such prohibition will be equally effective even when no
pornographic literature is involved. But because these restrictions are
utilized primarily, if not solely, to force a sale of pornographic literature,
this Note will be particularly directed at the forced sale of such literature.
The Nature and Scope of the Problem
In an effort to determine the use that is made of tying contracts on a
national level, questionnaires were sent to various state retail druggist
associations throughout the country, to many of the druggist associations
servicing the larger cities, and to some independent drugstore and news-
stand operators. Most of the replies indicated that tying contracts were
not used in the replier's market area, and some made specific reference
to conscientious cooperation extended by the distributors in helping to
keep smutty literature off the newsstands. However, a sufficient number
replied that tying contracts were used in their area, illustrating that this
questionable selling method merits national concern. 9 One reply stated
that not only were tying contracts in general use in the large metropolitan
area where he was located, but that it is common knowledge that they
are used in all sections of the United States. 10
A formal contract need not be entered into by the distributor and
retailer to fit within the definition of "tying" contract, it being sufficient
if the distributor forces the retailer to purchase a second (or tied) article
6 See note 1 supra.
• The "twilight zone" poses the future problem of obscenity legislation. See
One, Inc. v. Oleson, 355 U.S. 371 (1958), reversing, 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957);
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958), reversing, 249 F.2d 114
(D.C. Cir. 1957).
8 For the most recent attempt see MODEL PENAL CoDE TENTATIVE DRAitr No. 6,
§ 207.10 (1957). The constitutional problems of obscenity legislation have apparently
been solved. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). But see Note, 33 NoTRE DAME LAw. 422 (1958).
9 The problem has become serious enough to cause specific prohibitive legis-
lation in fifteen states. See note 74 infra.
10 Letter from Waller and Waller, attorneys for National Association of Retail




in order to obtain the dominant (tying) product." The various methods
used by the distributor in forcing his full line on the retailer are strikingly
illustrated by the letters, written by victims of these pressure tactics,
which were sent to a House Committee that convened in 1952 to study
the over-all problem of obscene literature.'
2
Although there may be more than one distributor in any given market
area, the publishers do not have their lines handled by competing dis-
tributors.' 3 Consequently, while there may be competition for the sale
of magazines and pocketbooks generally, each distributor has a monopoly
in the particular lines he handles. And, as is often the case, if one dis-
tributor handles all or many of the fast-selling weekly or monthly
periodicals, he can use this monopoly to force the retailer to accept the
pulp publications and hobby magazines which the retailer would other-
wise purchase elsewhere or simply refuse to buy. Certainly if the "tied"
books or magazines could be sold on the basis of their quality content,
tying contracts would serve no purpose whatsoever.
14
Tying Contracts Under Section 3 of the Clayton Act
The legality of tying agreements has been the subject of adjudication
ever since the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act' 5 in 1890. The
results of the early cases prosecuted under the Act emphatically show
that the Supreme Court's primary concern was to protect the individual
supplier's freedom to contract,' 6 and only manifestly coercive selling
through the use of monopolistic power would be stopped.' 7 However, in
1914 Congress enacted the Clayton Act'8 which, both by its express
language' and by judicial interpretation, 20 broadened the area of tying
restriction illegality.
11 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. V. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
(dictum).
12 Hearings Before the Select Committee of the House on Current Pornographic
Materials, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., at 386-87 (1952).
13 For a general description of how magazines are distributed on a national
level, see the testimony of Samuel Black, Vice President, Atlantic Coast Independent
Distributors Association, in Hearings, supra note 8, at 34-58.
14 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949): "In the usual case
only the prospect of reducing competition would persuade a seller to adopt such a
contract and only his control of the supply of the tying device, whether conferred by
patent monopoly or otherwise obtained, could induce a buyer to enter one." Id. at
306. See also, MILLER, UNFAIR CoI 'aTrrioN, A STUDY IN CRITERIA FOR CONTROL
OF TRADE PRAcricEs 194 (1944).
15 29 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
16 Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
17 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 247 U.S. 32 (1918).
18 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
19 Section 3 of the Clayton Act reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,... to lease or make
a sale or contract for sale of . . . commodities, whether patented or un-
patented, . . . on the condition . . . that .the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not deal in the ... commodities of a competitor ... where the effect of . . .
such condition . . . may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly .... 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).
20 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922), where
the Court held certain tying restrictions violative of § 3 of the Clayton Act which
just four years earlier had been declared not within the provisions of § 1 of the
Sherman Act. See note 17 supra.
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But notwithstanding the broad competitive limitations found in section
3 of the Clayton Act, there still remained the requirement of lessening
or possible lessening of competition resulting from such tying restrictions
before any action could be brought against the vendor. This is illustrated
by a 1949 decision in which the Supreme Court issued sweeping dictum
that "trying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition." 21 This statement is dictum only because the issue before
the Court was one of exclusive dealing arrangements, 22 but the opinion
gives clear recognition to the fact that section 3 restrictions apply both
to tying clauses and exclusive dealing arrangements. 23 The issue before
the Court was stated to be:
... Whether the requirement of showing that the effect of the agreement
"may be to substantially lessen competition" may be met simply by proof
that a substantial portion of commerce is affected or whether it must also
be demonstrated that competitive activity has actually diminished or
probably will diminish.24
The same issue had been before the Court on several prior occasions
and an apparent diversity arose as to the necessary lessening of com-
petition standard to be applied in cases involving tying contracts and
those deciding the validity of requirements contracts. In Standard Fashion
Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.,25 the Court interpreted section 3 to mean
that requirements contracts were not prohibited unless it could be shown
that they would "probably" lessen competition; yet seven days later, in
a case involving tying restrictions, the Court intimated that the mere
presence of dominance in the market for the tying product was sufficient
to find a lessening of competition as envisioned by section 3.26 The
Court's recognition of this dual standard became manifest in the Stan-
dard Oil case:
Since these advantages of requirements contracts may often be sufficient
to account for their use, the coverage by such contracts of a substantial
amount of business affords a weaker basis for the inference that com-
petition may be lessened than would similar coverage by tying clauses,
especially where use of the latter is combined with market control of
the tying device. (Emphasis added).27
Perhaps the most important decision in the way of defining what will
constitute a section 3 lessening of competition is International Salt Co. v.
United States.28 The defendant leased his patented machines for the
utilization of salt products on the condition that the lessee use in them
21 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
22 Courts appear to use "exclusive dealing" and "requirements" contracts
interchangeably.
23 See also Kintner, The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission: A Two-year
Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1174-93 (1955).
24 337 U.S. at 299 (1949).
25 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
26 United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
27 337 U.S. at 307 (1949).
28 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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salt supplied solely by the defendant. The Court, without determining the
defendant's proportion of the business of supplying such machines, and
deeming as irrelevant that there was no evidence as to the actual effect
of the tying clauses upon competition, held that as long as the volume
of.business in the tied product affected is not "insignificant or insub-
stantial"2 9 such restrictive leases are violative per se of section 3 of Clay-
ton Act. When this decision is compared with the one rendered twenty-
five years earlier in United Shoe Machinery Co. v. United States,3 0
where apparently the seller or lessor must have occupied a dominant
position in the market for the tying device before tying restrictions
would be held illegal, it is obvious that courts have greatly extended
the area of illegality covered by section 3.
It has been suggested 3 ' that the comparatively liberal standards for
finding the requisite lessening, of competition as postulated in the above
two cases merged to form the nucleus of the standard described in Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States.32 Though again the Court
could speak of the Clayton Act's tying clause only through dictum,33 the
language used leaves little doubt as to the conditions necessary before a
section 3 violation will be found:
From the "tying" cases a perceptible pattern of illegality emerges: when
the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the "tying"
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" product is
restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed
in § 3 of the Clayton Act because from either factor the requisite potential
lessening of competition is inferred. (Emphasis added).34
In attempting to apply this "perceptible pattern of illegality" to the
common factual circumstances surrounding the use of tying restrictions
by magazine distributors, several possible objections must be overcome.
First, the cases that most strongly state the Court's stand on "tying"
restrictions are concerned with the tying of an unpatented article to a
patented device.33 A mere reflection on the express language of section
3, "whether patented or unpatented," should provide a satisfactory answer
to such an objection.3 6 Also, several federal courts of appeals have
29 Id. at 396.
30 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
31 See note 23 supra at 1175.
32 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
33 Involved in this case was the legality of a publishing company's actions in
allowing advertisers to purchase only combined insertions appearing in both its
morning and evening papers, not in either separately. A substantial part of the
opinion is dictum because for some unexplained reason the government sought to
enjoin such actions inder §§ 1-2 of the Sherman Act. The fact that the Court
focused part of its opinion on defining and clarifying § 3 of the Clayton Act is' a
strong indication that it intended this dictum to be treated as authority for sub-
sequent § 3 questions. ,
34 345 U.S. at 608-09 (1953).
35 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); United Shoe
Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
36 Patented articles apparently had to be expressly included in the wording
of the Act because the decision in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912)




found illegality under section 3 even without a patented tying device.
3 7
The next question that might be raised is whether the tied product must
be used in conjunction or together with the tying device before the
agreement becomes illegal. Although the vast majority of the cases in-
volving tying agreements which have been before the courts have been
decided on this particular factual situation,38 this can easily be explained
in that the lessor or seller of a highly desirable machine or other mechan-
ical device, whether patented or not, has an ideal situation in which to
force the purchase of the subsidiary product used in connection with the
tying device. There is very little in the statutory language, in judicial
decisions, 39 or in logic to show that the framers of the Clayton Act
intended to make such a spurious distinction. Certainly the Supreme
Court in Times-Picayune indicated that it would not interpret section
3 so narrowly, and in fact did recognize that the tying restriction utilized
by the publisher40 was a type that could be enjoined through the pro-
visions of section 3. Also, a committee appointed by the Attorney
General to study the anti-trust laws described the type of arrangement
between the magazine distributor and his retailer as "full-line forcing"
and expressed the opinion that this business practice was embraced by
the general text of section 3.41
Finally, before any tying restriction can be held illegal there must
exist the necessary present or potential lessening of competition or the
possible creation of a monopoly. 42 In areas where there are no competing
distributors, this requisite would seem difficult to meet, for the effect on
competition is not readily ascertainable, and the distributor already has
a monopoly in both the tying and the tied products.43 But in areas where
independent distributors, or perhaps small publishers, are attempting to
sell their lines, any use of tying restrictions seems open to immediate
attack on the basis of two Supreme Court decisions, even without a
37 Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 776 (1945); Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.
1942). Although it appears as if the Supreme Court has never held a tying agree-
ment violative of § 3 of the Clayton Act without a patented product as the tying
device, its opinion in Northern Pac. Ry v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), ex-
pressly rejected such a distinction when § 1 of the Sherman Act was involved, and
left no doubt that it would also reject this distinction when such an action is
brought under § 3. Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See text at notes 19-20
supra.
38 See cases cited in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. at 300 (1949).
39 The definition of "tying contract" in Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
supra note 37, appears to consider such a contract illegal only when the commodities
are to be used together.
40 See note 33 supra.
41 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 138 (1955).
42 See note 19 supra.
43 The fact that the distributor has a monopoly in the tied product makes this
particular tying restriction rather unique. The requisite competition foreclosure can
still occur because any other distributor, though not competing for the sale of a
particular line of publications, nevertheless is fighting for a place on an already
crowded newstand.
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showing that these distributors were foreclosed from any substantial
market. The language of the Court in both Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States and Standard Oil Co. v. United States shows a
marked tendency to infer a lessening of competition anytime a complete
market control of the tying product is proved. In fact, Justice Frank-
furter's statement in the Standard Oil case that if illegality is to exist
under section 3 "some sort of showing as to the actual or probable
economic consequences of the agreements" 44 must be made "in the
absence of a showing that the supplier dominated the market"45 lends
weight to the argument that in market areas where there is actual or




This suggested position of the Supreme Court regarding tying agree-
ments receives added support from two cases decided under section 5
of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. 47 In Distilled Brands, Inc.
v. Dunigan,48 a liquor wholesaler who sold imported scotch, then in
great demand, to retailers only if they took proportionate amounts of
rum, was found guilty in the administrative hearing of violating the
"exclusive outlet" and "tied-house" provisions of the act. On appeal, the
44 337 U.S. at 302 (1949).
45 Id. at 304. Although the Court seemed to hold that the seller must both
dominate the market for the tying product and restrain a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied product before an action could be successfully brought under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, its subsequent decision in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), affirming 142 F. Supp. 679 (1956), indicates that
dominance of the tying market is no longer necessary for a finding of illegality
under § 1, and that primary attention should be focused on the amount of com-
petition restrained in the tied product.
46 This inference principle may exist only in the courts, and not in hearings
before the Federal Trade Commission. In Insto-Gas Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REo.
RaP. ff 25,188 (FTC 1954), the Commission, though recognizing the abstract
proposition that "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition" nevertheless maintained that tying contracts, without more, are
not illegal per se. Though Insto-Gas did not have a monopoly in the tying product,
and thus is distinguishable from the problem under discussion, the Commission was
emphatic in its unwillingness to find guilt in any case without some evidence showing
actual or potential competitive injury. This unwillingness was re-emphasized in a
subsequent hearing involving Insto-Gas. The examiner, while recognizing that
there was necessarily some lessening of competition caused by Insto-Gas' restrictive
leases, nevertheless held that the record did not afford an adequate basis for an
informed determination as to whether such leases substantially lessened competition.
Insto-Gas Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. RaP. ff 26,610 (FTC 1957). Most likely this
divergence of treatment afforded tying restrictions results from a recognition by the
FTC that it is an expert body and has been given all the necessary means to make a
thorough investigation before deciding that a particular business method sub-
stantially lessens competition. This the courts cannot do, so they must rely on this
inference principle in most cases. For a discussion of the import of the Commission
decision when viewed with the Standard Oil case see Kintner, The Revitalized
Federal Trade Commission: A Two-Year Evaluation, 30 N.Y.U.L.Rav. 1143, 1176
(1955).
47 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 205 (1952).
48 222 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1955).
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Second Circuit affirmed the agency decision, and stated that this type of
tying sale restrained commerce in a twofold way.
The buyer is coerced into accepting a product which he would otherwise
not have purchased; and other sellers of the tied-in product are to that
extent excluded from the market.49
The court further considered and rejected petitioner's argument that the
statutory prohibition should apply only when such a tying sale prevented
the retailers with whom it dealt from buying any whisky or rum from
other wholesalers, and not when it only reduced their purchase of other
rums. Thus the factual situation is strikingly similar to the one existing
where there is more than one distributor of publications in any market
area.50 Both distributors have monopolies in both the tying and the tied
products. And although the quoted language might be stretched to
include as illegal even those tying sales which were not shown to have
foreclosed competition, but were merely coercive in nature, the decision
at least stands for the proposition that partial foreclosure or interference
in the sale of any similar product will be sufficient grounds for a finding
of illegality. 51
Because this case was decided under the Federal Alcohol Administra-
tion Act it has, standing alone, no real significance for purposes of re-
solving the problem under discussion. But when read in conjunction with
a subsequent opinion delivered by the Supreme Court in a similar case,
52
the combined language becomes highly influential in affording reasonable
grounds for conjecture as to future judicial treatment of tying agreements
or restrictions. The Court, reversing the court below,53 held that here, as
in the Distilled Brands case, the wholesaler violated the "exclusive out-
let" and "tied-house" provisions of the Act. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking
for a unanimous Court, cited a House Report 54 to show that Congress,
by passing the Alcohol Act, intended to prohibit trade practices that
were similar to those prohibited by the anti-trust laws. 55 Continuing, the
Court said that:
The tie-in sales involved here seem to us to run afoul of that policy, since
the retailer is coerced into buying distilled spirits he would otherwise not
49 Id. at 869.
50 It is appropriate to note that the reason the distributor resorted to tying
sales was because he could buy scotch from the importer only if he bought a
proportionate amount of rum. This is one of the major reasons why publication
distributors are forced to use tying contracts. Unwanted publications are forced onto
them, and in order to keep their stock down, they force their unwanted publications
onto the retailer. See testimony of Robert C. Woods, Hearings Before the Select
Committee of the House on Current Pornographic Materials, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
321-24 (1952).
51 The court uses two cases decided under § 3 of the Clayton Act as sole case
support for its affirmance of illegality: Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S.
293 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
52 Black v. Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24 (1957).
53 Magnolia Liquor Co. v. Cooper, 231 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 352
U.S. 877 (1956).
54 H.R.REP.No. 1542, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. at 12 (1935).
55 Here too the Standard Oil and International Salt cases, along with United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) and Mercoid Corp. v.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), are used by the Court
to illustrate the type of situation held to be illegal under the antitrust laws.
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have purchased at that time, and other sellers of the products are to that
extent excluded from the market that would exist when the demand
arose.56
Thus, in unmistakeable language, the Supreme Court has laid down a
new criterion for determination of illegality under section 3 of the
Clayton Act. If this trade practice violates the business policies en-
gendered by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, then a similar
practice by magazine distributors should be equally violative of the
Clayton Act, for both laws prohibit the same trade practices in parallel
areas of business activity. Not only do both Acts condemn such a tying
sale when there is a present lessening of competition, but the statutory
prohibition extends even to those instances where other sellers of similar,
but not identical, products are at least partially excluded from. a future
market.
Tying Contracts Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
Congress, in 1914, passed the Federal Trade Commission Act 57 as
the first of its double-barrelled attack against unfair competition. 5s Section
5 of the Act, as amended, 59 reads in part: "Unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in com-
merce, are declared unlawful." By both Congressional intent and judicial
approval the Federal Trade Commission was authorized to strike- down
trade practices not included in either the Sherman or Clayton Acts.60
With such apparent power vesting in the FTC, a Commission order
Yequiring a party to cease and desist from utilizing tying restrictions
would seem to have no difficulty receiving immediate approval of the
reviewing court, especially since tying contracts were one of the specific
practices intended to be prohibited by the act.6 ' But in 1920, the Supreme
Court, in affirming an annulment of a Commission order, held that the
refusal of dealers to sell cotton "ties" unless the prospective purchaser
would also buy the "bagging" to be used with the ties was plainly in-
sufficient to show an unfair method of competition within section 5 of
the Act.62 Even when the Court was presented with practices considered
contrary to public morals, it had to find the requisite injury to com-
petition before affirming a Commission cease and desist order.65 Thus,
without more, the early application of the FTCA offered no greater
chance of effectively stopping tying restrictions than did the early applica-
tion of section 3 of the Clayton Act.
56 355 U.S. at 26 (1957).
57 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1952), amending 38 STAT. 717 (1914).
58 The Clayton Act was passed nineteen days after the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.
59 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1)(1952).
60 See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, .310 (1934), where the
Court discusses the Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, S.RmP.
No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914), which ultimately became the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
61 See 51 CONG. REc. 14090, 14097-98 (1914).
62 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
65 FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934). The Court demanded
this showing of competitive injury despite its apparent, awareness of_,the broad
trade restrictions included within the provisions of the Act.
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But something did occur, in the form of the 1938 Amendment to the
FTCA,64 which has changed the entire complexion of judicial interpreta-
tion of section 5. To the original denouncement of "unfair methods of
competition in commerce" was added "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce." This was immediately interpreted to mean that the
Federal Trade Commission now could have jurisdiction over trade
practices which prior to the amendment could not conceivably be classi-
fied as unlawful. The Third Circuit, though reversing a Commission order.
stated:
It was for the purpose of clothing the Commission with jurisdiction to
act in respect of unfair acts or practices in commerce regardless of their
effect upon competition that the Amendment of 1938 was offered and
enacted.65
The court recognized that this jurisdiction would lie only if the unfair
practice affected the public interest, but emphasized that competition no
longer need be affected before a Commission order would be afrmed. 66
The committee report,67 cited by the court as authority, is highly signifi-
cant in determining what void in the FTCA was intended to be filled by
the amendment. Recognizing that courts had so construed the act as
affording protection to competitors primarily and the consumer only
incidentally upon proof of competitive injury, the Report reads:
By the proposed Amendment to § 5, the Commission can prevent such
acts or practices which injuriously affect the general public as well as to
those which are unfair to competitors. In other words, this amendment
makes the consumer who may be injured by an unfair trade practice of
equal concern, before the law, with the merchant or manufacturer injured
by the unfair methods of a dishonest competitor.68
One important limitation is placed on the Commission's jurisdiction:
before an act or practice in commerce can be restrained, it has to be
such as is performed or perpetrated by one materially engaged in the
trade affected by the offenses, whether or not there is competition. 69
When this new, judicially-approved standard of jurisdiction is applied
to the present problem, the following seems apparent. Where tying
restrictions are used in competitive market areas, section 5 is certain
to be an effective weapon in halting the use of tying restrictions in the
publications field, for even under section 3 of the Clayton Act these
restrictions are highly susceptible to successful prosecution, and section
5 at least includes violations of the Clayton Act. 70 Even in areas where
the distributor's monopoly is complete, and presumably outside the scope
64 § 5 of the FTCA, as amended, 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(1)
(1952).
65 Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 643 (3d Cir. 1941).
66 Accord, Wolf v. FTC, 135 F.2d 564 (7th Cir., 1943); Pep Boys-Manny,
Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941).
67 Report of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R.REP.No.
1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937).
68 Id. at 3.
69 In Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1941), the Commission's
cease and desist order was overruled because petitioner, who published and dis-
tributed pamphlets alleging that aluminum used for cooking was dangerous, was
not engaged or financially interested in the cooking utensil trade. Compare with
Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941). See Globe Cardboard
Novelty Co. v. FTC, 192 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1951).
70 Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 at 609 (1953)
(dictum).
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of the Clayton Act, there is valid reason, because of the 1938 Amend-
ment, to expect the FTC to issue cease and desist orders anytime tying
restrictions are under Commission investigation. It is difficult to con-
ceive that the Commission, once it undertook an investigation, would
not determine that such trade practices were contrary to the public
interest, for a twofold interest seems involved: If the retailer succumbs
to the pressure tactics, a serious question of public morals arises; 71 and
if the retailer refuses the smut literature and consequently does not
receive the popular magazines, the public is inconvenienced in purchasing
such magazines, and in some instances deprived of the opportunity
altogether. Also, the use of tying contracts in the magazine distribution
trade necessarily fulfills the requisite of being "perpetrated in the trade
affected" 72 for the distributor has a vital financial interest in the trade.
Since the Federal Trade Commission has fertile grounds for a finding
of illegality, the major obstacle to any effective use of the FTCA seems
to be in interesting the Commission sufficiently for them to initiate action,
for under the act they are the only ones that can do so. Once a finding
of illegality is made, it is highly unlikely that a court will upset the finding
on appeal.
73
Direct Prohibition on the State Level
Although the Federal Government has apparently deemed it un-
necessary to prohibit specifically the use of tying devices in the magazine
distribution business, research has disclosed fifteen states that have
thought the problem serious enough to prohibit this type of tying re-
striction under penalty of criminal prosecution. 74 These statutory pro-
hibitions can be divided into six distinct categories. (1) Two states
75
make it a criminal offense for a distributor to refuse to sell statutorily
unobjectionable publications to a retailer unless such retailer also pur-
chases publications which are prohibited from sale to minors under the
same or another section of the statute. (2) Three states76 determine
unlawfulness under the same test employed in the first category, excepting
that the retailer need only reasonably believe that the publications are
prohibited under the section dealing with the sale of obscene literature to
minors. This type of statute would appear to be more readily acceptable
to the courts, for it precludes the necessity of a judicial determination
that certain literature was obscene within the meaning of the statute,
71 Cf. FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), where it was
decided that the sale of devices which encouraged gambling by children was
contrary to public policy and morals.
72 Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d at 640 (3d Cir. 1941).
73 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
74 Fla., Idaho, Ill., Md., Minn., Mont., N.J., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Tex.,
Va., Wash., Wis.
75 MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 422 (1957); VA. CODE ANw. § 18.113.1(b)
(Supp. 1956). Idaho also has a similar statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1509 (Supp.
1957), but its significance is limited because of the broad language of the Idaho
statute listed in note 81 inira.
76 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 847.01(6) (Supp. 1957); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
94.3601(3) (Supp. 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1038 (1958).
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as long as they could find that the retailer was not acting unreasonably
in believing that such literature was prohibited by statute. (3) Four
states77 make it a misdemeanor for any person to require, as a condition
to a sale of any publication, that the purchaser or consignee also pur-
chase any other article, book, or publication which he reasonably believes
to be obscene. The standard in these statutes allows a great deal of dis-
cretion on the part of both the retailer and the judiciary, for presumably
obscenity statutes do not prohibit every publication that could reason-
ably be held to be obscene. (4) Two states78 make it a criminal offense
if a magazine distributor refuses to sell to a retailer any publication
unless the retailer accepts other publications which are obscene, lewd
or lascivious. Although these statutes do not include a standard for
determining what is obscene, the courts can, and undoubtedly will, rely
on the state obscenity statute in reaching any decision. (5) One state79
makes a distributor criminally liable if he requires a retailer, as a con-
dition to the purchase of periodicals, to accept material known by the
distributor to be lewd, obscene or indecent. (6) Four statess make it
unlawful for any magazine distributor to require a retail dealer to
purchase any particular publication in order to obtain from the distribu-
tor any other publication. It is highly significant that under this last
grouping there is no necessity for the distributor, the retailer, or the
court to apply any standard of obscenity before determining whether a
particular tying restriction comes within the prohibitions of the applicable
statute. There can be no defense that the tied publications were not
obscene within the meaning of the statute, 8 nor that the retailer was
unreasonable in his determination that certain publications were obscene
within the meaning of the statute or otherwise. Undoubtedly all of these
77 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 617.243 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1141-b (Supp.
1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.34.1 (Anderson Supp. 1957); ORIE. REV. STAT.
§ 167.152 (1957).
78 ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 38, § 472a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:115-3.1 (Supp. 1957). Under the Illinois law, the retailer must refuse to sell or
attempt to sell the obscene literature before the distributor's subsequent refusal
to sell other publications is unlawful, while the New Jersey statute holds that the
mere refusal by the retailer to accept delivery of the obscene literature is sufficient
to make the tying restriction unlawful. This distinction is important because the
Illinois retailer, having been legally coerced into accepting this literature, may
attempt to sell it in order to alleviate storage problems or to avoid the trouble of
sending it back to the distributor for refund.
79 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.21(2) (1958).
80 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-118 (Supp. 1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-77.2
(Supp. 1957); Tax. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 527a. (Supp. 1957); WASH. REv. CODE §
19.18.130 (1952). Washington limits its ban to contracts which require the retailer
to receive for resale comic books that are appealing to or likely to be read by minors.
Also, it should be noted that New Jersey has two statutes which effect the use of
tying restrictions in the magazine distribution business. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-77.2
(Supp. 1957), passed in 1955, would appear to have been enacted in order to avoid
the obscenity determination that was unecessary under the 1953 Act, NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:115-3.1 (Supp. 1957).
81 See cases cited in note 7 supra for examples of magazines that were not
considered statutorily "obscene."
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laws have in some degree halted the sale of obscene literature.8 2 But to
really eliminate the forced purchase of "twilight zone" trash the Idaho,
New Jersey and Texas laws seem ideal, for there is in them, at least
implicitly, a recognition that these tying restrictions can both restrain
trade and corrupt morals.
8 3
Conclusion
The primary difficulty in approaching and analyzing the problem of
tying restrictions in the magazine distribution business arises from the
lack of adequate market data from which to make any conclusive
determination concerning the scope of use of this practice. Although the
dictum in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States and Standard
Oil Co. v. United Statess4 indicates that the effect of tying restrictions on
competition would have to be de minimis before avoiding the restrictions
of section 3 of the Clayton Act, there exists a formidable obstacle to their
suppression in that individual retail newsdealers are unlikely to incur
the expense of litigation in instituting any civil action against the dis-
tributor. And, although both section 3 of the Clayton Act and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act afford the Federal Trade Com-
mission sufficient basis for launching effective action against such tying
practices, as yet no action in this area has been taken, and unless the
problem becomes manifestly acute the Commission might well feel there
are more important trade practices that deserve its attention.
Still, the very fact that at least fifteen states8 5 have passed laws
directly limiting, and in some instances prohibiting, the use of tying
restrictions in this particular business area lends considerable weight to
the argument that this problem has become nationally significant. What
apparently has been regarded as relatively unimportant by federal author-
ities has caused specific prohibitive legislation on the state level. If this
use of tying restrictions has created a morals problem of sufficient
gravity in at least fifteen states to require direct statutory prohibition,
the assumption appears valid that the same problem exists presently,
or will exist in the near future, in many of the remaining states. Con-
sequently, state legislation, patterned after the Idaho and Texas statutes,
8
appears to be the best available method of smothering in its incipiency
any attempted use of tying restrictions in the publications trade. With
82 Illinois State Senator Arthur J. Bidwill, who co-sponsored ILL. ANN. STAT. c.
38 § 472a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957), stated that since the passage of the law there
have been very few complaints about obscene literature from religious or parental
sources. Letter to Notre Dame Lawyer, Mar. 3, 1958, on file in Notre Dame Law
Library.
83 Idaho expressly recognizes this dual result in IDAno CODE ANN. § 48-119
(Supp. 1957), which reads:
It is the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting the foregoing (§
48-118) that there be no restraint of trade in the magazine business, and that
the public and retail dealers handling magazines and periodicals be free from
having to purchase, sell or read the type of magazine which tends to degrade,
debase, or be immoral or suggestive by way of pictures, title, or words."
84 345 U.S. 594 (1953); 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
85 See note 74 supra.
86 See note 81 supra.
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such a statute for support, local civic, educational and religious groups
can vocally encourage prosecutive action against any violator. There is
no reason for any state to wait until tying devices become a real menace
before acting. Even those states which presently have some type of
statutory prohibitions would do well to re-evaluate this legislation to
determine whether it is effectively curbing the use of tying restrictions.
Certainly there will always exist those degenerate dealers who eagerly
peddle any type of obscene literature that is legally available. But some
protection must be afforded both the public and those retailers who, by
means of economic coercion, are forced to accept magazines unfit for
public consumption. Since the federal agencies refuse to accept this
custodial responsibility, the burden falls squarely on each state to enact
direct prohibitive legislation, thereby making a major advance in the
continuing battle against obscenity.
Daniel W. Hammer
